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Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability
AARON TWERSKI" & ANTHONY J. SEBOK7*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is one of the axioms of tort law that a defendant may not be held li-
able unless he caused the injury about which the plaintiff is complaining.
This is true even if the defendant is a wrongdoer. Culpability in the air, so
to speak, is not the business of tort law, but of public law. The question of
causation is, therefore, a critical one for every tort suit. It is not just a mere
technicality, but an element that is equal to duty and breach.
Of course, the question of causation is really two questions: cause-in-
fact and proximate cause. As Wex Malone noted over forty years ago in
his classic article, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, proximate cause often
gets the lion's share of attention by courts and scholars because it seems so
obviously affected by considerations of policy and legal theory.' Malone
argued that the attention lavished on proximate cause should not distract us
from the important policy decisions that are contained in the judicial deci-
sion to allow-or disallow-consideration of cause-in-fact by a jury. The
decision to let the jury consider the factual question of cause-in-fact is a
peculiar judicial decision, since in theory it reflects nothing more than a
judicial evaluation of how a reasonable jury would treat the facts as pled.
From that point of view, judicial review of motions to dismiss based on
cause-in-fact should themselves involve nothing more than an idealized
dress-rehearsal of what the jury will have done in the jury room. Malone
rejected this characterization of judicial review of the cause-in-fact issue.
On many levels, he argued, the decision whether or not to allow a jury to
decide whether the defendant's negligence was a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff's injury depends on various policy goals and assumptions hidden
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within the tort system.
The problem presented itself to Malone most basically at the level of
but-for causation. Malone noted that even this test for cause-in-fact, which
seems, for all its limitations, so easy to apply, requires certain assumptions
about probability. For example, in the cases in which a seaman had fallen
overboard, Malone noted that courts originally would not allow these cases
to go to the jury on the grounds that it would require the jury to speculate
on whether the victim would have been able to reach the life-preserver
before drowning.2 After 1931, Malone noted, the pattern reversed itself, to
the point where no court refused to allow the jury to judge whether the
absence of a safety device was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury.3
In 1956, Malone wrote, a defendant would be able to avoid going to the
jury on the cause-in-fact question only in the "extreme" case where the
facts pled revealed that "the chance of a successful rescue was virtually nil
.... " Malone found a similar situation in cases involving the violation of
statutory fire safety regulations and the negligent interruption of water used
by firefighters.5
It is important to see that Malone was not concerned in these cases
with the problem of concurrent causation or overdetermination. Rather, the
problem was one of underdetermination. The reason we don't know if the
defendant's breach of duty caused the injury is because we don't know
whether the victim was in a position to benefit from the increase in safety
that the duty was supposed to guarantee. For example, it may be the case
that thirty-three percent of the time sailors who fall overboard would be
helped by a life preserver. What we don't know is whether the plaintiff
was, for whatever reason, in the position of the lucky one of three who
would have been able to use the safety device or in the position of the un-
lucky two of three who would not have been able to use the device.
2. See id at 75-76 (citing New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920); Ford v.
Trident Fisheries Co., 122 N.E. 389 (Mass. 1919)).
3. See Malone, supra note 1, at 77 (citing Di Nicola v. Pennsylvania R.R., 158 F.2d 856 (2d Cir.
1946); Pollard v. Seas Shipping Co., 146 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1945); Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co.,
112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940); Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R, 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931); Zinnel v. United
States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925); Bochantin v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 96 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Mo. 1951); Tompkins v. Pilots Ass'n for Bay & River Del., 32 F. Supp.
439 (E.D. Pa. 1940)).
4. Id at 77. Malone's observation has continued to have force. See, e.g., Reyes v. Vantage
Steamship Co., 609 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1980); Walsh v. Zuisei Kain K.K., 606 F.2d 259 (9th Cir
1979); Gardner v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962); Kline v. Maritrans CP,
Inc., 791 F. Supp. 455 (D. Del. 1992).
5. See Malone, supra note 1, at 79-80 (citing Delaware & H.R. Corp. v. Felter, 98 F.2d 868 (3d
Cir. 1938); Hurley v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 156 S.W. 57 (Mo. App. 1913); Valentine v. Minnea-
polis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 118 N.W. 970 (Mich. 1908); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Saunders, 295
S.W. 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Other cases are inconsistent with Malone's observations. See, e.g.,
Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson, 225 S.W.2d 702 (Mo. 1949); Ocean View Improvement Corp. v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 140 S.E.2d 700 (Va. 1965); But see Collins v. Collins, 946 P.2d 1345 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1997) (allowing case to go to jury).
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Whether the victim was lucky or unlucky is a consequence of many actual
but unknowable facts which have nothing to do with the defendant's con-
duct. We know that of every three accidents, the defendant's negligence is
the but-for cause-in-fact of one death. We just don't know which one, and
cannot know. The same would be true where the ratio was reversed: then,
the defendant's negligence would be the cause of two deaths out of every
three.
Malone asked why the tort system selects some set of underdetermined
causes and not others.6 He observed, for example, that what is true about
violations of safety norms on ships and in fires is not true about medical
malpractice, where underdetermination regularly leads to the dismissal of
cases! He offered two observations. First, he suggested that where the
defendant is proved to have been highly culpable in the manner through
which they violated the plaintiff's interests, courts have been willing to
allow juries to consider cause-in-fact even in cases where it is highly im-
probable that the defendant's culpable act caused the plaintiff's injury.
Malone noted that, just as proximate cause is relaxed by the Restatement
for intentional torts, courts "seldom hesitate to allow the jury a free range
of speculation" on the question of cause-in-fact in intentional torts
Malone suggested that the inverse relationship between the defendant's
culpability and judicial scrutiny of cause-in-fact maps onto the various
levels of negligence. Second, Malone suggested that courts will send the
question of cause-in-fact to the jury even in cases of dramatic underdeter-
mination where the defendant breached a duty that was "designed to pro-
tect against the very type of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed."9
Where the risks that eventuated are high on the proximate cause risk list,
Malone suggested that courts will be less demanding regarding cause-in-
fact; conversely, for more remote risks that might just pass muster on
proximate cause, courts will demand more in the way of proof of cause-in-
fact"0 This variant of the risk rule explains the life preserver cases, since
there was no other reason for imposing a duty to provide life-preservers
except the chance-no matter how unlikely-that it would make a differ-
ence.
Malone noted that in both malpractice and interruption of fire-fighting
cases, what the victim loses often is "merely a gambler's chance" that, but
for the defendant's breach of duty, the victim would not have suffered an
6. See Malone, supra note 1, at 72-73.
7. See id. at 85-87 (citing Connellan v. Coffey, 187 A. 901 (Conn. 1936); Kuhn v. Banker, 13
N.E.2d 242 (Ohio 1938)).
8. Id. at 72-73.
9. Id. at 73.
10. See id. at 74-75. This is clearly the lesson of Re)otwds v. Texas & Pacfi Railwy Co., 37 La.
Ann. 694 (1885), a case on which Malone placed great significance in his article. See Malone, sftra
note 1, at 74-75.
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injury." Malone's use of the term "gambler's chance" is important-since
it refers to what in later years would come to be called "loss of a chance."
Malone's point was that courts feel torn over the loss of a chance cases and
they lurch between crediting them and discounting them for a variety of
reasons rooted in both policy and tort theory itself. In the malpractice
cases, at least at mid-century, courts did not allow juries to provide full
compensation for the loss of a chance because of the special and highly
respected role that medicine played in society." Conversely, Malone sug-
gested that defendants who cut off the hoses of fire fighters would be
forced to face a jury's wrath because such acts were perceived to be reck-
less and highly culpable." Without some extra reason of the sort offered by
Malone, allowing a jury to impose liability for the entirety of an injury in
every loss of a chance case would make defendants, as a group, pay for
more injuries than they caused. Judges understood this, and so they used
culpability and the risk relation-which are irrelevant to solving the prob-
lem of underdeterminacy-to solve the problem of which subset of loss of
a chance cases to allow juries to hear. 14
II. LOST CHANCES AND ENABLING TORTS
The loss of a "gambler's chance" -the loss of a less-than-substantial
chance of protection as a result of another's fault-is a tricky problem that
has not been fully solved in tort law. It has come up in the context of
11. Malone, supra note 1, at 80 (quoting Valentine v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 118
N.W. 970, 974 (Mich. 1908)).
12. See Id. at 85. The solicitude shown by the courts towards the medical profession has eroded
significantly since 1956. See, e.g., David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause In Fact, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 1765, 1784-85 (1997) ("Judicial attitudes on these matters have changed significantly.... The
current frontier involves cases in which the testimony converges on the view that the medical negli-
gence in suit deprived the patient of a fifty percent or less chance of achieving a better result.' (citing
Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664
P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983)).
13. See Malone, supra note 1, at 80-81.
14. Richard Wright has argued that Malone misread these cases and created a problem where none
existed. According to Wright, "a full reading of the cases in which the courts seem to lessen or shift the
burden of proof regarding causation usually discloses that the court was explicitly or implicitly con-
cemed that the defendant not escape liability under the governing but-for test when.., It was more
likely than not ... that the defendant's omission of the safety precaution contributed to the Injury."
Richard Wright, Causation In Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1741, 1809 (1985). It is not clear what
Wright means by "contribution." Wright himself admits that in a "loss of a chance" case, the Increase
of risk of injury by 20% does not necessarily "contribute" to the plaintiff's injury. I at 1815 (referring
to cases involving the "failure to provide the proper lifesaving equipment or to properly diagnose and
treat [a] patient"). Malone properly understood the life-preserver and interruption of fire-fighting cases
as exactly these sorts of cases. As Wright himself admits, one can describe a "loss of a chance" as
"contributing" to an injury only if one declares that the chance itself is the interest that was Injured. Id
at 1815-16.
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medical malpractice in misdiagnosis cases,"s as well as in some toxic torts
cases.16 But as Malone's article suggested, in the general run of things tort
law has quietly dealt with underdetermination and loss of a chance through
the rough and ready application of policy-driven distinctions." What is
important to see is that although some things have not changed since
Malone's day, some things have, and we can no longer assume that our
rough and ready way of handling causation in loss of chance cases will
always serve the purposes of tort law.
One area where the problem of the loss of a chance raises serious
questions for tort law is in what Professor Robert Rabin has come to call
"enabling torts."' 8 An enabling tort, according to Rabin, is not the same as
negligent entrustment. 9 It instead encompasses all situations where the
defendant "facilitates" the realization of an independently created risk by
doing something that they knew or should have known would "pave the
way" for a third party to harm the victim?' With this concept in hand,
Rabin links together cases in which a train engineer "enabled" the assault
of a female passenger by forcing the passenger to get out at a dangerous
location;21 where a car owner "enabled" the accidental injury of a driver by
leaving his keys in the ignition of his car, allowing it to be stolen and used
for a getaway by a thief ' where a social host "enabled" the accidental
injury of a driver by allowing an inebriated patron to drink and then use a
car,2 where a landowner "enabled" the assault of a resident by failing to
provide security;24 and finally, where a handgun manufacturer "enabled"
the shooting of a citizen by failing to take steps to ensure that the handguns
that were sold in one state did not end up being used by criminals in an-
15. See, e.g., Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 474 (lung cancer); Haml, 392 A2d at 1280 (myocardial
infarction); see also infra notes 63,65,68 (citing additional sources).
16. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
17. Some might argue that the general trend in tort law since 1956 has been to turn the exceptions
identified by Malone into the rule. See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Declidn of Ca=se, 76 GEO.
W. 137 (1987).
18. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAULL. REv. 435 (1999).
19. See id at 438-39 (distinguishing enabling torts from "negligent entrustment" torts described in
RESTATE3MENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 390 (1965)).
20. Id at 439.
21. See id. (citing Hines v. Garrett, 108 S.E. 690 (Va. 1921)).
22. See id. at 440 (citing Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996)).
Rabin notes that some jurisdictions recognize a duty not to enable the wrongdoing of another only if
"special circumstances" obtain. IH. (citing Hergenether v. East, 393 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1964); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc, 245 N.W.2d 186 (Mfn. 1976); Guaspari v. Gorsky,
36 A.D.2d 225 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971)).
23. See Clendening v. Shipton, 196 Cal. Rptr. 654 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Whelchel v. Laing Proper-
ties, Inc., 378 S.E.2d 478 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 496
N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1986).
24. See Rabin, sirpra note 18, at 444 (citing Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave Apart. Corp., 439 F.2d 477
(D.C. Cir. 1970)).
other state.2
Rabin is right that as a matter of duty and proximate cause, the line of
torts beginning with the negligent railroad engineer has progressed logi-
cally to handgun manufacturers. But as Malone cautioned, sometimes it is
not enough to look at just the tort doctrines of duty or proximate cause to
see where and how policy concerns should guide our judgement-some-
times we have to look at cause-in-fact.
Rabin sees a continuous and undisturbed logic between the key-in-the-
ignition cases, the landowner cases, and the handgun cases. He fails to see
that within the landowner cases there is a breakdown on the issue of cause-
in-fact. First, compare the key-in-the-ignition cases with the landowner
liability cases. In the former, the duty is premised on the foreseeability that
the sort of person who takes a car that does not belong to him or her is
likely to drive in a reckless manner, and the failure to act on this duty is
seen to increase significantly the risk of collision (which exists at some
background level for all drivers and pedestrians). What is more, the ques-
tion of cause-in-fact in these cases is easy: the likelihood that had the de-
fendant taken the required precaution, the plaintiff would not have been
struck by a negligent driver is substantial. There are no serious underde-
termination concerns since it is clear that removing the keys from the igni-
tion is a precaution that would have probably succeeded. It is not like the
cases with which Malone is concerned. What the defendant has taken from
the victim is not a gambler's chance, but a substantial chance of protection.
But the question of underdetermination lurks below the surface of
many landowner cases. In the earliest cases, where residents were as-
saulted in their buildings, it seems clear that the causal relationship be-
tween the breach of duty and injury was substantial. In Kline v. 1500 Mas-
sachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.,26 for example, the failure to have a
25. See id at 435 (citing Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). In this
Article we will discuss two additional cases. See Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 3323
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding by jury of no causation for injuries resulting from negligent marketing);
Merrill v. Navegar, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 146 (1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000) (reversing
summary judgment in favor of defendant gun manufacturer on grounds that a duty exists to not increase
the risk of an "inherently dangerous" activity through negligent marketing). To the extent that Hamil-
ton fits Rabin's "enabling tort" category, so do Halberstam and Merrill. For an excellent discussion of
Halberstam, which yielded no written opinion, see Timothy D. Lytton, Halberstam v. Daniel and the
Uncertain Future ofNegligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms Manufacturers, 64 BROOK. L. REV.
681 (1998). Much of what we say here is also applicable to the claims brought by municipalities
against gun manufacturers to the extent that they are based on the theory that manufacturers failed to
take reasonable steps to prevent handguns from being sold "directly" to criminals. Some of the suits
brought by municipalities sound in negligence and many sound in nuisance. See David Kairys, Legal
Claims of Cities Against the Manufacturers of Handguns, 71 TEM,. L. REV. 1 (1998). Our comments
are most directly relevant to the negligence claim, although to the extent that cause-in-fact is also a
necessary element of plaintiff's case in nuisance, our comments may be relevant to this latter group of
cases as well.
26. 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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guard at the entrance and, more importantly, the failure to lock another
entrance, significantly facilitated access to the building by non-residents.
The defendant's causation objection-that perhaps the assault was com-
mitted by another resident of the building or a guest, was not substantial
enough to warrant taking the cause question away from the jury. Rabin
moves quickly from Kline to shopping center cases, with the goal of mov-
ing from the shopping center cases to the handgun cases." But in the
shopping center cases in which all the plaintiff lost was a gambler's
chance, the courts have been taking cases away from the jury for the sort of
cause-in-fact reasons that Malone anticipated. In Lopez v. McDonald's
Corp..' for example, the court held that the defendant's breach of duty to
provide adequate protection in the form of an unarmed security guard
could not be the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries, which were caused
by a determined and armed psychopath. The court acknowledged that the
plaintiff's expert argued that the presence of a guard would have increased
the chance that the psychopath would have been deterred or less successful,
but viewed this argument as speculative?' Similarly, in Nola M v. Univer-
sity of Southern California," the court held that even if plaintiff's expert
was correct and the defendant had operated its campus security in a care-
less fashion, no jury could find that the satisfaction of its duty would have
protected the victim'
In the shopping center cases that Rabin does not discuss it is clear that
the enabling torts are meeting with resistance because the courts are un-
willing to allow juries to find that the defendant took from the plaintiff a
gambler's chance at safety?3 Of course, the real question is why the courts
27. See id. at 487 n.24.
28. See Rabin, ara note 18, at 445-46 (discussing Sharon P. v. Annan, Ltd., 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 640
(Cal. 1997); Ann U. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr, 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993); Peterson v. San Fran-
cisco Community College Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); Abner v. Oakland Mall Ltd., 531 N.W.2d
726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc, 445 A.2d 1141 (NJ. 1982); Miller v. New
York, 467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984)). This next level of cases involve shopping centers and college
campuses, but for convenience we will refer to them as "shopping center" cases.
29. 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Ct App. 1987).
30. See id. at 449 C'Otherwise stated, McDonald's negligent conduct is not a substantial fcftor in
bringing about plaintiffs' injuries if their injuries would have been sustained even If McDonald's had
provided the unarmed, uniformed, licensed security guard....').
31. 20 Cal. Rptr2d 97 (Cal. CL App. 1993) ("Causation is an established element of the law of
negligence in California, perhaps because it imposes rational limits on liability which otherwise at-
taches under thejudiciary's expansive view of duty.., abstract negligence, wich is all that hapened
here, will not support liability.").
32. See id. at 108-09.
33. As Rabin's discussion of Ann M, 863 P.2d at 207, and Sharon P., 65 Cal. Rptr.2d at 640,
indicates, California has taken the lead in developing thejurisprudence of the duty of shopping centers,
parking lots, and campuses to protect entrants from criminal assaults by third parties. See Rabin, mra
note 18, at 445-46. Therefore, it is worth noting that other states have indicated that they approve of
the approach taken by California in Lope= and Nola M. See, eg., Godfrey v. Boddie-Noell Enter, Inc.,
843 F. Supp. 114, 122-23 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting Nola W's focus on the failure of the plaintiff to
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have found that the loss of a gambler's chance in shopping center cases
insufficient to establish causation in contrast to the cases Malone analyzed,
such as the life preserver and fire-fighting cases. One might want to apply
Malone's two rationales and note that in the shopping center cases where
cause-in-fact blocks the plaintiffs' case, the defendant's breach of duty is
not accompanied by substantial culpability nor by a close relationship be-
tween the risk realized and the duty breached by the defendant. The sec-
ond consideration helps explain, for example, why the courts have been
much more willing to allow juries to hear those cases where the defendant
had notice of prior criminal activity related to the victim's hann. 4
As long as the defendant's breach of duty enables a substantial risk of
loss of a chance at protection, then Rabin is correct: our recent history has
revealed a steady expansion of duty to prevent the enabling of wrongful
acts by third parties. Where the breach of duty enables a non-substantial
risk, the courts are willing to allow juries to consider the cause-in-fact
question only under certain policy-driven circumstances. What then are we
to make of the handgun cases? One might think that they would fit under
Malone's model: even if the breach of duty-negligent distribution-only
takes away a gambler's chance of safety from the plaintiff, the defendants
are highly culpable in a way that the operators of shopping centers are not.
The courts, one might argue, have the same reason to allow juries to con-
sider these cases of underdetermination just as in the cases of sailors and
fire-fighting.
There is some force in this observation, and it may explain why trial
courts in some recent handgun cases allowed those cases to go to the jury
even though their cause-in-fact elements are arguably as underdetermined
as in the shopping center cases.35 The very act of producing handguns car-
ries with it an air of culpability, and in at least one case, the manufacturers
of the product involved-an automatic pistol-surrounded their product
with disgusting and anti-social advertising." But, as noted above, the deci-
sion to allow a jury to award compensation for the loss of a chance in-
volves a trade-off. On the one side are the policy goals that Malone de-
prove cause-in-fact); Kolodziejzak v. Melvin Simon & Assoc., 685 M.E.2d 985, 991 (I1. App. Ct.
1997) (citing Nola M. and finding that whether plaintiff's death by gunshot "could have been prevented
by the addition of an additional security guard" at a strip mail was "at best speculation and conjecture"
and thus ordering a directed verdict for strip mall defendants); Allright San Antonio Parking, Inc. v.
Kendrick, 981 S.W.2d 250, 256 (rex. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Lopez for the point that defendant's
breach of duty to provide a security guard may not be the cause-in-fact of a "random attack by a homi-
cidal maniac").
34. See, e.g., Ann M., 863 P.2d at 207. Rabin himself has acknowledged this. See Rabin, supra
note 18, at 445.
35. Compare Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Halberstam v. S.W.
Daniel, Inc.; No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); with Ann M., 863 P.2d at 207; Nola M., 20 Cal.
Rptr.2d at 97; Lopez v. McDonald's Corp., 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
36. See Halberstam (No. 95 Civ. 3323); see also Lytton, supra note 25, at 688.
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tailed. On the other side is the knowledge that, for every ten cases in
which a jury awards full compensation for the loss of a chance, the major-
ity of defendants will be paying for an injury they didn't cause. This phe-
nomenon is present in all cases where there is some probability that the
defendant's breach was not an actual cause. Malone's point was that the
lower the probability, the more the court must justify allowing a jury to
impose the cost of the accident on the defendant.
Until now, the only policy concerns that have been discussed are those
that go in the direction of justifying a jury's treatment of a gambler's
chance as if it were a substantial chance. This has seemed fair, where it
has occurred, partly because the alternative-denying the victim any com-
pensation--seemed like a harsher alternative where the defendant was cul-
pable or breached a duty closely related to the injury that was inflicted.
But as the shopping center cases remind us, once the question of cause-in-
fact begins to turn on very low probabilities, courts are reluctant to impose
liability in a regime in which full compensation is the only legal response
available. Furthermore, where the all-or-nothing causation rule is applied
to a very large number of cases, the imposition of full damages begins to
chafe even more than it does in the idiosyncratic case. The sailor falling
overboard, and the negligent interruption of fire protection are all idiosyn-
cratic cases where even if the odds were only one in three that the defen-
dant's breach of duty caused the harm, one did not expect this type of acci-
dent to arise very often. The number of injuries that the defendant did not
cause, for which he would have to be the insurer, would be small, and
worth paying for, given the other policy considerations at stake.
As we move along the continuum of idiosyncratic cases from those de-
scribed in Malone's article to shopping center liability to handguns, we see
these forces come into play again in a way that does not allow the status
quo ex ante. Admittedly, the shopping center cases are also idiosyncratic,
although less so-as a general matter, crime does occur with sufficient
frequency to produce a potentially large plaintiff pool. But, more impor-
tantly, the size of the gambler's chance lost in the shopping center cases
sometimes looks very small. As the courts have pointed out in the cases
which they took from the jury: "It is an easy matter to know whether a
stairway is defective and what repairs will put it in order... but how can
one know what measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict,
the degenerate, the psychopath and the psychotic?"" The balance of fac-
tors shifts significantly in the handgun cases. These cases are not idiosyn-
cratic. Some, like Hamilton and the municipal suits, foresee a plaintiff
class that is very large-anyone injured by a handgun that has been negli-
gently marketed. Even those cases that present a single unique plaintiff
37. Nola M, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Nemxk, 186 A.2d 291,
297 (NJ. 1962)).
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and a single unique weapon present an argument that is both designed and
amenable to repeated litigation against the same set of defendants. Even
more than in the shopping center cases, these are, as Rabin would have it,
"enabling torts" involving very low gambler's chances.38 The probability
that the defendant's negligent marketing was the cause of the injuries com-
plained of is very low.
How should the courts respond? Should they treat these cases like the
sailor cases or the shopping center cases? If they choose the former path,
they will be forcing gun manufacturers to pay for a huge number of acci-
dents that they did not cause, and they will be doing this quite self-
consciously, since one cannot hide behind even the facade of idiosyncrasy
in these cases. If they choose the latter path, they will allow actors who are
more culpable than most shopping center operators to escape liability for
even the handful of accidents their negligence enabled.
II. THE PROMISE OF PROPORTIONAL CAUSATION
There is a way out of this dilemma. When Malone wrote, he was
forced to use an "all-or-nothing" model of damages. Tort law had refused
to recognize any form of proportionality. Comparative fault had only just
begun to be adopted, and comparative contribution between tortfeasors was
still seen as impossible from a doctrinal, if not a technical, perspective.
But since 1956 our understanding of the relationship between causation
and damages has become far more nuanced. In a handful of fields-most
notably medical malpractice and toxics, commentators have argued for
proportional damages based on the proportion of risk a negligent act im-
posed on the plaintiff. In 1984 in a landmark article, Professor David Ro-
senberg, applied this approach in the context of toxic torts.39 As Rosenberg
noted, in many cases involving a carcinogen, the defendant's negligence
does not make it more likely than not that the victim will develop cancer."
Often the breach of duty adds an increased quantum of risk to a preexisting
level of risk. Yet we know that if the risk of cancer is increased from ten
percent to twenty percent for one-hundred victims, the breach of duty will
have caused a physical injury to ten people. Rosenberg noted that under
the "strong" version of the "preponderance of the evidence" rule for cause-
in-fact, where the plaintiff must show individualized evidence of the con-
nection between the defendant's breach of duty and the plaintiff's cancer,
38. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
39. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984). While the idea of proportional causation was
discussed prior to 1984, see, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance In Personal
Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. 1353 (1981), It
was fully explored in the context of mass torts in Rosenberg's article. See Rosenberg supra at 851.
40. See Rosenberg supra note 39, at 858-59.
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all plaintiff cases will be dismissed.4 Even if plaintiffs are allowed to ar-
gue a "weak" version of the preponderance of the evidence rule, they Aill
still lose, since they will not be able to show that, as statistical matter, the
breach of duty made it more likely than not that any one of them would
suffer the injury.42 And yet, we know that as a factual matter, the breach of
duty did cause an injury to ten victims of the defendants' breach of duty.
Still, allowing a jury to find that the defendant caused all twenty cancers
would be equally unjust, since it would impose the cost of ten naturally
occurring cancers on the defendant.43
Rosenberg argued that under circumstances of factual uncertainty-
what we earlier called underdetermination-any causation rule will result
in erroneous verdicts that either give nothing to the victims or require the
defendant to pay for naturally occurring injuries, which might vastly out-
number the injuries they caused." This dilemma is a consequence of de-
manding that damages be "all-or-nothing" under circumstances of causal
uncertainty. Since we know that we will never know which injuries the
defendant's breach caused, it is unclear why we insist on asking juries to
pretend that they are determining just that fact. On the other hand, since
we do know that we can be reasonably certain of the additional risk of in-
jury that the defendant's breach of duty imposed on each victim, it is not
clear why we don't take advantage of that information and require the de-
fendant to compensate the victims for that. A traditional argument against
compensation for risk imposition is that it undercompensates those who
were harmed by the defendant and gives windfall to those who were not4
Yet, the problems of undercompensation and windfall are inescapable
in situations of underdetermination; where the damages system insists on
all-or-nothing compensation, courts rely on a variety of policy reasons to
err on the side of one or the other. Compensation for risk imposition can-
not solve this problem. What it solves is the problem of excess punishment
vis-a-vis the wrongdoer." When the tort system opts to err on the side of
allowing juries to decide cause-in-fact in cases where all the victim has lost
41. Id. at 862-63.
42. See id. at 863.
43. Imposing the full cost of these cancers on the defendant is also unfair to those members of
society who develop cancer naturally but to whom the defendant breached no duties. This latter group
will receive nothing (except what social insurance might give them) even though they are no less de-
serving of aid than those ten victims of the defendant's breach of duty whose injuries xere not caused
by the breach but by natural forces. P.S. Atiyah sees this injustice between victims of naturally occur-
ring injuries as a serious problem for modem Anglo-American tort law. ee P.S. ATYAH, THE
DAMAGES LOTrERY 143-45 (1997).
44. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 863-66, especially 866 n.65.
45. One response to this argument is to identify the imposition of risk ex ante, not the realiton of
the risk expost, as the harm which the defendant's breach of duty has caused the plaintiffi &e Christo-
pher Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing RLsks, 38 U.C.LA. L REV. 439, 466-
69, especially n.112 (1990).
46. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 875, especially 875 n.101.
is a gambler's chance in an idiosyncratic case, the social costs of asking the
defendant to pay for what he did not cause are not unbearable, given other
policy considerations. In the case of mass torts, however, it can be unbear-
able for two reasons. First, the full imposition of liability can result in as-
tronomical damages. But second, where many cases are decided simulta-
neously, the knowledge that the court is deliberately requiring the defen-
dant to pay a certain amount of money for harms that it knows the defen-
dantcould not have caused disturbs our faith in the tort system in a way
that is not so obvious and not so clear when cases are decided idiosyncrati-
cally. In the case of sailors who fall overboard, we know that eventually
one hundred such cases will occur, and if the jury is allowed to hear them,
various defendants will pay for approximately sixty-six injuries that they
did not cause. But this will come about diachronically, not synchrbnically.
Where all the injuries are suffered synchronically, it is impossible to ignore
the harsh reality that we are imposing liability for far more injuries that the
defendant did not cause than for those he did.
In fact, as Rosenberg points out, to the extent that the rest of the world
(insurance companies, for example) discounts the value of the life of
someone who has been exposed to a toxic risk that has not yet manifested
itself, we can similarly calculate the additional risk that the defendant has
imposed.47 In a sense, by increasing the chance of cancer in each of 100
persons by 10%, the defendant has, through his negligence, reduced each
person's "chance" of escaping cancer by 10%. For the person whose
chances of escaping cancer were 99%, her chances have been reduced to
89%. For the person whose chances were 59%, her chances have been
reduced to 49%.4' But the toxic tort victims share the same form of loss
with the sailors-for each, the chance they value has been actually, but not
substantially, reduced or destroyed by the defendant's negligence. Each
has still suffered the loss of a "gambler's chance."
IV. PROPORTIONAL CAUSATION IN THE COURTS
It is clear that what Malone identified as "gambler's chance" cases now
fly under the banner of "lost chance ' and the "indeterminate plaintiff."5
Faced with traditional causation rules that made liability depend on
whether the plaintiff was able to establish that the negligence of a defen-
dant was more probably than not the cause of the plaintiff's injury, many
courts have actually opted for some form of proportional recovery.5 What
47. See Id. at 885-87.
48. Unlike the sailor who lost a chance at something improbable-safety from drowning-cach
victim loses a chance at something generally probable--freedom from cancer.
49. See infra notes 63-66, 68 (citing sources).
50. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
51. See infra notes 65, 66, 68.
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forced the move to proportional recovery is a story worth telling.
Herskovitz v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound ' is the lead case.
In Herskovitz, plaintiff had visited the defendant's hospital with complaints
of chest pain and coughing in early 1974.' In July 1975, the patient con-
sulted a private physician who diagnosed lung cancer. The cancerous lung
was surgically removed; however, the cancer metastasized and the patient
died in;1977.' Assuming the negligence of the defendant in failing to di-
agnose the cancer in 1974, the court was faced with a dilemma. Had the
cancer been diagnosed in 1974, the patient's chances of surviving a "Stage
One" lung cancer were thirty-nine percent 55 By the time the cancer was
actually diagnosed it had become a "Stage Two" cancer, however, and the
statistics for survival had dropped to twenty-five percentO Thus, the pa-
tient suffered a reduction in his chance of survival as a result of the negli-
gent diagnosis Under the standard causation formulation, a plaintiff
must establish that, more probably than not, plaintiff's injury would have
been avoided had the defendant not been negligent 5 If this formulation
were to govern the plaintiff would lose, because even had the cancer been
diagnosed in a timely manner, the probability that plaintiff would have died
from cancer anyway was sixty-one percent. Neither the majority nor con-
curring opinions were prepared to countenance such a result, and they
agreed that the plaintiff should prevail.59
The opinions differed, however, as to how damages should be ascer-
tained. The majority opinion decided to allow recovery for lost chance in
negligent malpractice cases, but it simply allowed the jury to assess dam-
ages as it saw fit, taking all the circumstances of the case into account.' A
more novel approach was suggested in the concurring opinion. Relying on
the work of a provocative law review article by Professor Joseph King,6'
52. 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983).
53. See i& at 475.
54. Seeid
55. See a
56. See t
57. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 476 (noting that somejurisdictions refuse even to submit the negli-
gence question to the jury unless a plaintiff "is able to show that it was more iMle, than not the harm
was caused by the defendant's negligence").
58. See id
59. See id at 477,479.
60. See id at 479.
61. See King, supra note 39. It should be noted that Professor King's act Ul formula for calcultion
of the damages was inaccurate to accomplish the goal of preventing both undercompensation zmd
overcompensation. See Aaron D. Twerski & NeU B. Cohen, The SecondF'eolution t2 Inform-ed Con-
sent: ComparingPsickas to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L REV. 1, 28 n.68 (1999) (citing King, Tra,
note 39, at 1382) (noting that this miscalculation has been repeated with "some frequency" by courts
wishing to adopt King's approach, as in Herskovlts, 664 P.2d at 486, and n MclFellips v. Saitn Frarcls
Hospita In=., 741 P.2d 467,476 n.25 (Okla. 1990)). As the Tverssd and Cohen atlee explains using
the McKellos court's calculations as an example, following King's formula to the letter would under-
value the patients tru damages due to lost chance and, for example, providt the McJellIps plaintiffs
2000l
the concurring opinion suggested that damages be tailored to reflect the
percentage of lost change inflicted by the defendant's negligence.62 The
case law since Herskovits breaks down into three categories. A significant
minority of courts refuses to allow lost chance recovery.63 Faced with the
stark statistics of a case like Herskovits, they would deny recovery in total-
ity. They find it impossible to cheat on causation utilizing the policy fac-
tors identified by Malone." Neither the gross negligence of the defendant
in failing to read an X-ray correctly nor the fact that early diagnosis is de-
signed to protect the plaintiff against the very harm suffered by the plaintiff
(non-treatment of the patient's cancer) is sufficient to overcome the unde-
niable reality that plaintiff cannot establish causation utilizing the tradi-
tional more probably than not standard. Other courts allow patients lost
with only 15% lost chance damages rather than the 20% calculated as due the plaintiff by Twerskl and
Cohen. See id Despite the original miscalculation of actual damages, however, the wisdom of Profes-
sor King's paradigm of calculating proportional damages by percentage of lost chance remains intact.
See id.
62. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 487.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Cumberbatch, 647 A.2d 1098 (Del. 1994) (refusing to recognize loss
of chance in a wrongful death action); Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1020
(Fla. 1984) (finding expert testimony did not establish that decedent had a better than even chance to
survive in the absence of negligence); Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 830 P.2d 1185,
1189-90 (Idaho 1992) (rejecting explicitly the doctrines of last chance and increased risk of harm);
Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr. Inc., 580 A.2d 206,214 (Md. 1990) (declining to recognize either a
pure loss of chance doctrine or a loss of chance approach to damages); Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d
758, 762 (Minn. 1993) (declining to recognize loss of chance in medical malpractice action); Clayton v.
Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439, 445 (Miss. 1985) ("Mississippi law does not permit recovery of damages
because of mere diminishment of the 'chance of recovery.'"); Kilpatrick v. Bryant, 868 S.W.2d 594
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that patient is not entitled to recovery for increase in risk of harm or loss of
chance of receiving better medical treatment); Volz v. Ledes, 895 S.W.2d 677, 679 (renn. 1995) (reaf-
firming Kilpatrick); Kramer v. Lewisville Mem'l Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 400 (rex. 1993) (holding
recovery totally barred "where preexisting illnesses or injuries have made a patient's chance of avoid-
ing the ultimate harm improbable").
64. See, e.g., Sherer v. James, 351 S.E.2d 1130 (N.H. 1986) ("A defendant physician Is entitled to
put the medical malpractice plaintiff to proof equally as stringent as that required of plaintiffs in other
negligence actions."); Jones v. Owings, 456 SX.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995) (reaffirming Sherer and re-
fusing to allow recovery for loss of chance).
For a review of the various rationales offered by the courts, see Darrell L. Keith, Loss of
Chance: A Modern Proportional Approach to Damages In Texas, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 759, 790-92
(1992). See also Patricia L. Andel, Medical Malpractice: The Right to Recover for the Loss of a
Chance of Survival, 12 PEFP. L. REv. 973, 976-77 (1985) (calling the "all-or-nothing" approach
"harsh" and reporting that it has been widely criticized as "result[ing] in oscillation between overlav-
ishness and niggardliness"); Leon L. Wolfstone & Thomas J. Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the
Loss of Chance, 28 MED. TRAI,. TEcH. Q. 121, 139 (1982) ("Most of the cases on loss of a chance...
have held that compensation should be allowed on an all or nothing basis... ."); Jeffrey L. Benson,
Comment, The Dilemma of Chance in Medical Mapractice: Should Illinois Recognize a New Cause of
Action for "Lost Chance" of Survability?, 9 N. ILL. L. REV. 575, 586 (1989) ("Since the majority of
jurisdictions award compensation on an 'all or nothing basis, a defendant may be held liable for the full
wrongful death damages even in cases where he only caused a portion of the loss."); Stephen F.
Brennwald, Comment, Proving Causation in "Loss of a Chance" Cases: A Proportional Approach, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 747, 781 (1985) ("The 'all-or-nothing rule' throws wrongful payments either entirely
on defendants or entirely on plaintiffs.").
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chance recovery without having to prove that there was a greater than fifty
percent chance of a better result.' This is done with the rather clear under-
standing that juries will discount the damages to take into account the like-
lihood that early treatment would not have been successful. A very sig-
nificant body of case law has embraced the suggestion of the Herskovitz
concurring opinion and assess damages by multiplying the full damages
that would have been awarded in a traditional causation by the portion of
the patient's chance of survival that was lost.'
65. See eg., Herslrovits, 664 P.2d at 479; Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., Inc., 688 P.d
605, 615 (Ariz. 1984); Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713,720 (La. 1986); Aaheim
v. Humberger, 695 P.2d 824, 828 (Mont. 1985); Ehlingerv. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754, 763 (Wis. 1990);
see also Andel, supra note 64, at 982, 993 (A minority of courts ... have allowed a relaxed standard
of proof of causation where the patient shows that the physician's negligent conduct in any way in-
creased the risk of harm to the patient or deprived him of some chance of recovery," and that such
recoveries have "received increasing approval by various courts over the years.'"); Francis Wayne
Thurman, Note, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice Cases: A Contra Kew With an Ex~aminaton of
Tennessee's CurrentPosition, 20 MEMms Sr. U. L REV. 81, 91 (1989) (MThe loss of chance doctrine,
as applied to medical malpractice, allows the plaintiff to recover for the loss of a less than even chance
of survival or recovery or for an increased risk of harm.").
It is notable that in an early New York case, Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Ho-pltal, 357 N.Y.S2d
508 (App. Div. 1974), the court sent the question of causation to the jury. How a New York court
would rule today is a matter of conjecture.
66. See, e.g., Sun City Communit, Hosp., 688 P.2d at 616 CMFThs formulation, of course, merely
recognizes thatjuries often discount damages according to the statistical evidence in order to accutely
evaluate the true loss.") (citation omitted); Ehlinger, 454 N.W.2d at 763 ("f the defendant's negligence
is found to have been a substantial factor in causing the harm, the trier of fact may also consider evi-
dence of the likelihood of success of proper treatment in determining the amount of damages to be
awarded."); see also Robert A. Reisig, Jr., The Loss of a Chance Theory In Medical Malpractice Cas:
An Overview, 13 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 1163, 1183 (1990) (reporting that one of the disadvantages of
allowing the trier of fact to determine damages "without providing any real guidelines" Is that "it is
incompatible with one of the major goals of recognizing the loss of a chance theory-a more accurmat
loss allocation"); Brennwald, supra note 64, at 782-83 (describing the jury valuation approach as the
simplest to apply and adequate where very little statistical medical evidence as to the lost chance exists
but that, where medical evidence is available, jury valuation runs counter to the lost chance doctrine's
goal of allocating damages more correctly). But see Shelly E. Smith, Comment, LOast Chance of Szr-
vival in Illinois: The Needfor Guidancefrom the llnots Supreme Court, 23 LOY. U. CMa. LJ. 155, 177
(1991) (reporting that the jury valuation approach gives "more leew-y" than a straight percentage
approach and that a possible benefit to this approach, despite considerable variation in xpert testimony
as to rates of survival, is that "the figure that ajury of twelve arrives at will be the result of a more
complex valuation process" that includes an assessment of more factors than would be considered with
a straight percentage approach).
67. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at479 (Pearson, J. concurring).
68. Almost all the cases in this category rely on the landmark article by Joseph H. King, Jr. See
King, supra note 39. See, ag:, Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1985); Dc-
Burkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 135-37 (Iowa 1986); Delaney v. Cadr, 873 P.2d 175, 186-87
(Kan. 1994); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 50 n.20, 52-53 nn.26-27 ( ich. 1990); Wol-
len v. DePaul Health Ctr., 828 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (ho. 1992); Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr. 805 P.2d
589,591 (Nev. 1991); Scafidi v. Seller, 574 A.2d 393,407-08 (NJ. 1990); Roberts v. Ohio Peramnte
Med. Group, Inc, 668 N.E.2d 480, 483-84 (Ohio 1996); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp, Inc., 741
P.2d 467, 476 (Olda. 1990); see also Reisig, supra note 66, at 1185 (repotng that most courts that
have addressed this issue of how loss of chance damages should be valued have "ustd variktons of
King's single outcome approach"); Smith, supra note 66, at 176-77 (reporting that this method of
2000]
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What is common to all three approaches, is that courts were unable to
escape the harsh reality of the statistical data that made it clear that full,
undiminished recovery could not be countenanced. The soft policy factors
that Malone suggested allowed judges to send cases to juries under a tradi-
tional causation test would no longer work. One cannot say that recovery
is based on a more probable than not standard when the real world facts tell
us otherwise. Either recovery has to be denied or it must go forward on
some theory of proportional recovery.
The other paradigm for proportional recovery for increased risk arises
from the toxic tort cases. Judge Jack Weinstein in fashioning the settle-
ment in In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,69 adopted the Ro-
senberg proportional recovery theory."0 Weinstein recognized that the
claims of Agent Orange victims could not be established by a preponder-
ance rule.7' Claims by veterans, for example, that exposure to Agent Or-
ange increased the incidence of soft-tissue sarcoma, would not support a
traditional finding of causation. Plaintiffs could not establish that the inci-
dence of cancer was more than double the background risk for the general
population not exposed to Agent Orange. 2 Nor was particularistic evi-
dence available that would allow a finding that any individual plaintiff's
cancer was attributable to Agent Orange. 3 Judge Weinstein posited the
following hypothetical case:
Let us assume that there are 10 manufacturers and a population of
10 million persons exposed to their product. Assume that among
this population 1,000 cancers of a certain type could be expected,
but that 1,100 exist, and that this increase is "statistically signifi-
cant" permitting a reasonable conclusion that 100 cancers are due
to the product of the manufacturers. In the absence of other evi-
dence, it might be argued that as to any one of the 1,100 there is
only a chance of about 9% (100/1100) that the product caused the
cancer.
74
He then made the following observation:
Suppose all 1,100 of those who were exposed to the harmful sub-
stance and who developed the cancer in the example join in a class
action against all 10 manufacturers. Let us say that damages aver-
valuing damages by the percentage of lost chance "has been widely accepted, in large part due to the
influence of Professor King's article").
69. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
70. See supra notes 39-42, 44,46-47 and accompanying text (discussing Rosenberg); see also In re
"Agent Orange", 597 F. Supp. at 838-39.
71. See id at 833-34.
72. See 1d; see also PETER H. ScHucK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS ToXIc DISASTERS IN TiUB
COURTS 187-88 (1987).
73. See In re "Agent Orange", 597 F. Supp. at 833-34 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
74. at 837.
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age $1,000,000 per cancer. A recovery of $100,000,000 (100 x
$1,000,000) in favor of the class would be allowed with the per-
centage of the award to be paid by each manufacturer depending
on the toxicity of its product. For example, if a company produced
only 20% of the substance in question but, because of the greater
toxicity of its product, likely caused 60% of the harm, it would
contribute 60% of the total amount. If accurate records are avail-
able on the composition of each defendant's product, that analysis
should be possible.
Since no plaintiff can show that his or her cancer was caused by
any one of the defendants, they should divide the $100,000,000 by
1,100, giving each a recovery of about $90,000. While any plain-
tiff might feel that his or her recover denigrated the degree of
har m, the alternative of receiving nothing is far worse .... "'
Judge Weinstein recognized that such an approach was inexact and that he
was working rough justice but he concludes:
We are in a different world of proof than that of the archetypical
smoking gun. We must make the best estimates of probability that
we can using the help of experts such as statisticians and our own
common sense and experience with the real universe! 6
V. THE HARD CAUSATION QUESTION IN HANDGUN CASES
Before turning to a discussion of the trilogy of recent handgun cases,
we wish to clear the brush. The discussion that follows deals solely with
the issue of but-for causation where the underlying theory of liability is
negligent marketing of handguns. For the purposes of the following dis-
75. Id at838.
76. Id It is important to see that the use ofproportionalization to determine damages did not climi-
nate the risk of plaintiff windfall in Agent Orange, whereas proportionalization through use of market
share did remove the possibility of windfall in Sbndell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980)
(burden of proof that defendant's negligence did not cause plaintiff's injtuy shifted and defendant liable
for portion of plaintiff's injury equal to proportion of its market share). In Sindcl, it was virtually
certain (because of the uniqueness of the injury) that the plaintiff was injured by some d:fendant's
negligence and that the defendant's negligence caused an injury to someone. In Agent Orange, because
each plaintiff faced a non-trivial risk of cancer simply from environmental factors inmrlated to the
defendant's breach of duty, forcing a defendant to pay any amount to each plaintiff would necessarily
produce windfalls to some plaintiffs. Thus, Weinstein's decision cannot be justified according to a
corrective justice argument that allows the "standards and burdens" of proof of causation to be modi-
fled where we know that the plaintiff suffered from a breach of a "relational duty of non-injury" at the
hands of an indeterminate defendant. see Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Correctve Justice
in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND TORT LAW (Gerald Postema ed., Cambridge Univ Press,
2001) (forthcoming Cambridge University Press) (discussing compatibility of market-share liability
with correctivejustice).
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cussion, we assume that there is a duty to protect against the criminal acts
of third persons and that the question of intervening superceding cause is
for the jury. We also exclude from our discussion the notion that handguns
are so inherently dangerous that they violate risk-utility norms and should
not be sold. Although this issue has been raised in litigation over the
years," the current wave of court decisions focus on negligent marketing."
It is to that topic and that topic alone that we address our causation discus-
sion.,
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek is the premier opinion in the field. The facts
are easily told. Twenty-five gun manufacturers were sued for negligent
marketing of handguns by seven plaintiffs who were either injured or killed
in criminal acts.8° The jury awarded damages for only one plaintiff, Steven
Fox, and apportioned damages based on the market share of each of the
three liable defendants.8" The case was tried before Judge Jack Weinstein,
the author of the Agent Orange opinion discussed earlier.82 In a forty page
scholarly opinion, Judge Weinstein takes the reader through all the steps of
the elements of the cause of action. We shall focus only on the elements of
negligent marketing and cause-in-fact.
The heart of plaintiffs' negligent marketing claim was that the defen-
dants had widespread knowledge of trafficking of handguns from states
that had "weak" gun control measures to states like New York that had
"strong" gun control laws. 3 A large number of guns used in crimes were
thus emanating from federal firearms licensee (FFLs).Y One study of
crime gun traces from twenty-seven cities revealed that up to one-third of
guns used in crimes by juveniles and one-half of those used by persons
77. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F2d 1532, 1533-34 (1lth Cir. 1986) (col-
lecting cases that similarly hold that the "ultrahazardous activity doctrine" is "inapposite" to circum-
stances where a gun with "no design defect" performs "exactly as intended" but is used to injure or kill
a person, and thus holding that a manufacturer could not be held liable for either manufacture or distri-
bution of a "Saturday Night Special" gun used to kill a woman); Delahanty v. inckley, 564 Al.d 758,
761 (D.C. 1989) (collecting cases which likewise "reject application of the 'abnormally dangerous
activity doctrine' to gun manufacture and sale'") (citations omitted).
78. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Merrill v. Navegar Inc., 89
Cal. Rptr.2d 146 (Cal. CL App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000); Halberstam v. S.W.
Daniel, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). For a discussion of these three cases, see Infra pp. 17-
23,26-30.
79. 62 F. Supp.2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
80. See Id at 808.
81. See id The following percentages of liability were assessed for each of the three defendant$:
American Arms, .23%; Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 6.03%; Taurus Intemational Manufacturing, Inc., 6.8%.
See id Although it was determined that for two other plaintiffs, Veronica Trott and Koichi Sunada,
some of the 25 defendants had proximately caused their injuries as well, those two plaintiffs could not
prove their damages for pain and suffering (which is all they had claimed). See id. at 811. Conse-
quently only plaintiff Fox recovered damages, See id
82. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Liig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
83. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
84. See id at 829-30.
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between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four were purchased from an FFL
within three years from the time of sale.' Such a rapid rate of diversion
from the legitimate retail market is indicative of substantial firearms traf-
ficking.' The alleged negligence was that the gun manufacturers failed to:
(1) require distributors to sell only to stocking gun dealers, i.e. dealers who
stock guns for sale at retail stores," (2) prohibit sales at gun shows, where
widespread unrecorded and unsupervised sales to non responsible persons
are likely to take place,88 and (3) analyze trace requests to locate retailers
who disproportionately serve as a crime source and then cut off sales to
distributors who do business with them 9
As to causation, Judge Weinstein's discussion is brief. Much of it is
directed toward the applicability of the market share theory to the instant
litigation.O He does, however, note that cause-in-fact is a problem. Citing
to Professor Rosenberg's article, Weinstein says that, "arguably, proof of
negligence and proof that negligence caused damage to some people, but
not necessarily to the particular plaintiffs in the case, would warrant allo-
cating proportional shares of damages among those who are liable defen-
dants."' He notes that under this approach one might grant a "relatively
small amount of damages" to individual plaintiffs taking into account the
increased risk created by the defendant's negligent conducY2 But then
Weinstein turns his back on the idea and concludes, "whatever may be the
conceptual legal arguments in favor of such an approach in the present
case, plaintiffs met their burden of producing evidence sufficient to support
the preponderance standard charged in the jury instructions and found by
the verdict. '
In the section of the opinion that follows, Judge Weinstein sets out to
support his conclusion that causation was established. Much of the discus-
sion is devoted to bolstering what Weinstein calls "general causation."
He rehearses the testimony of an expert witness that gun violence is conta-
gious and that guns begat more guns.9 Turning to "specific causation"
(cause-in-fact), the entirety of the discussion is found in the following two
paragraphs:
The testimony of Joseph Vince that most guns used in crime are
85. See id at 826.
86. See id For a discussion of the integrity of this three-year so-called "time-to-crime'" period as a
true indicator of illegal behavior by firearms dealers, see Infra note 99 ad accompanying text.
87. SeeHamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 826,831.
88. Seeid
89. See id at 831.
90. See i at 835-39.
91. Id at 835 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 39).
92. Id
93. I
94. 1dat836.
95. See id at 836-37.
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not stolen but trafficked from retail sources has already been ad-
verted to. Mr. Vince also testified to criminals' preference for new
guns, ones that are "new in the box," and therefore relatively
"safe" in that they have no prior homicides attached which can be
traced and attributed to subsequent purchasers. With regard to
New York City crime guns in particular, Lieutenant McCann testi-
fied that of guns seized by the joint NYPD/ATF task force on ille-
gal trafficking wbile he was director, "a very, very small percent-
age were reported stolen." This evidence was sufficient to permit
rational jurors to infer that the gun used to commit the Fox crime,
like the majority of crime guns, made its way into the underground
market via an initial lawful sale that might have been prevented
had the manufacturers insisted on more stringent selling proce-
dures as a condition for supplying guns to their distributors.
Dr. Stewart's testimony that handgun manufacturers could fea-
sibly reduce the risks associated with their product by exercising
greater control over retail sales, and that their failure to do so "has
been a significant contributing factor in the development of an ille-
gal market," provides further support for the jury's finding of
proximate cause. Additional support for this finding was provided
by Lieutenant McCann, who testified that since stocking gun deal-
ers were generally more responsible retailers who tended not to
permit or engage in illegal trafficking activities, limiting initial gun
sales to such dealers would greatly reduce the number of guns en-
tering the illegal market. The evidence of the origin of most New
York crime handguns in retail sales outside New York, the general
practices surrounding the making of those sales, and the degree of
supervision or its lack over first retail sales, was sufficient to per-
mit a reasonable jury to conclude that the negligent marketing and
distribution of handguns by manufacturers was a substantial factor
in the promotion and development of an underground illegal mar-
ket supplying New York criminals, and thus increasing the prob-
ability of death or serious injury such as that suffered by Mr. Fox."
One wonders how Judge Weinstein was able to conclude that the evi-
dence supported a finding of causation under the preponderance standard.
First, it is clear that the mere fact that criminals purchased their guns from
legal sources tell us nothing about the volume of guns that came about due
to the alleged negligent marketing practices. Guns that would be available
to criminals from non-negligent marketing provide the baseline for decid-
ing increased risk. It is only the negligent overage that reckons into causa-
96. a at 838 (citations omitted).
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tion.9 Second, Weinstein makes no reference to any data that focuses on
whether, even absent negligent marketing, criminals could use nonretail
methods to obtain non-negligently marketed handguns!' We simply do
97. In the same agency report that published the statistics relied upon in Hamilton, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms CATF") listed numerous alternative avenues by which crime guns are
obtained-by criminals other than directly from a retail FFL. See BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, &
FMEARM, YOUT CRI E GUN INTERDICTION INIATIVE, CRIME GUN TRACE ANALYS!S REPORTS:
THE ILLEGAL YOUTH FIREAMIS MRKETS IN 27 COMUNITIES 14 (1999) [hereinafer YoUTrH
FIREARMS MARKETS IN 27 COiMNITIES]. One of the researchers, Glenn Pierce, along with ATF
agents and other experts concede that negligent practices of dealers may not be the prima reason why
a dealer "may have many guns traced back to it.... It can be a variety of things that have nothing to do
with the dealers...." Craig Whitlock, Crime Guns Flow from Md Shop, Data Show, WASH. POST,
June 11, 1999, at A-1. Guns obtained by these alternative avenues, therefore, could comprise a signifi-
cant number of crime guns ultimately traced to a legal sale from an FFL but which do not Indicate
illegal marketing by retail FFLs. Such alternative non-retall FFL avenues listed include: private used
sellers, privately bartered used guns, guns stolen from FFLs, guns stolen from common carriers, guns
stolen from manufacturers, and guns stolen from houses. See YOUTH FuEMS MARKT IN 27
COMMUNITIES, supra
For example, between 1998 and 1999, firearms dealers voluntarily reported approximately
"1,900 interstate thefts, involving over 3,700 firearms." Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
ATF News: Treasury, ATF Release Firearms Report, Gun Trafficking Actions, at 1
<http-//www.atftras.gov/pressffyOOpress/020400fireamsreport.htm> (visited Mar. 8, 2000) (citing
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIIEAns, COM CE IN FiREA . S IN THE UNITED STATES
(Feb. 2000)) [hereinafter COmMsRCE IN FREARMS]. Also, studies by the Department of Justice
("DOJ?), which survey criminal arrestees who have used crime guns rather than simply assessing the
pool of recovered crime guns successfully traced by law enforcement, indicate hat "many" adult and
juvenile offenders "have either stolen a firearm or kept, sold, or traded a stolen firearm." MAuANNE
W. ZAwrr, BUREAU OF JUSTiCE STATiSTICS, UNTED STATES DFPARThIENT OF JUSTICE, SELECTED
FINDINGS, FIEA is, CIE, AND CmMIAL JUSCE GUNS USED IN CRiES 3 (1995). As many as
"9%" of arrestees surveyed had acquired a crime gun through theft, and as many as "28%" had ac-
quired a gun through an illegal market such as a "drug dealer or a fence." IM Moreover, of all inmates
surveyed in one 1991 state prison survey, "10% had stolen at least one gun, and 11%,N had sold or traded
stolen guns." Id In another study, DOJ cited a 1986 survey of inmates in which "a major theme" was
that "theft was an important means of obtaining firearms for those with criminal intentions" and that
"32/o of surveyed felons had stolen their most recently acquired handgun." NATIOAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, UNrrnE STATES DEPARnTENT OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BU , GUNS IN Ah.ICA: NA-
TIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF FIREARmS 7 (1997). Common sense dictates then that
some significant portion of guns ultimately traced to an FFL could have been obtained through such
alternative means or by theft from a legal purchaser and is, therefore, not the result of negligent mar-
keting by the FR, such as illegal sales to an unqualified purchaser or even to a "straw man." Conse-
quently these admitted alternative avenues of obtaining crime guns even further reduce the likelihood
that a defendant FFL's negligent marketing practices are the actual cause of a criminal obtaining a gun.
98. See discussion, supra note 97. The negligent marketing cases also implicate a combined "sub-
stantial factor" and intervening cause question. It is certainly the case that even if guns were not negli-
gently marketed many criminals would obtain guns for the commission of crimes. Depending on the
nature of the criminal and the incentive to commit a crime ajury might find that the fact that a gun was
negligently marketed was not a substantial factor in the injury or death of the plaintiff. According to
Professor Lytton, this was the precise reason that the jury found for the defendant in Halbertam v.
S.W. Daniel, Ina, No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Se Lytton, supra note 25. It should be noted
that even if ajury were to find cause-in-fact based on the substantial factor test, ajtuy would be entitled
to find that the determination of the criminal to obtain a gun from whatever source would constitute an
intervening superseding cause. It is interesting to note that both the substantial factor and the proxi-
mate cause questions may each be subject to statistical determination. That is, it may be possible to
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not know how many fewer gunshot wounds would occur if negligent mar-
keting was obliterated from the face of the earth. Indeed, the brute statis-
tics that Weinstein makes reference to early in his opinion indicated that
one-third of guns used in crimes by juveniles and one-half used by persons
between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four were purchased from an FFL
within three years of the commission of the crime. 9 In order to even come
close to a preponderance argument, one would have to assume that every
gun used by persons in these age groups came about due to negligent mar-
keting. Surely, it is possible that the vast majority of these crime guns did
not arrive at their destination through negligent marketing. We do not
know whether a gun ended up in the hands of a criminal through a non-
FFL source or an FFL source that had not marketed handguns
negligently.I"o To ignore these possibilities is preposterous.
Sans the impressionistic opinion of the experts that negligent market-
ing increases the pool of guns available to criminals, there is no evidence
of any kind quantifying the effect of negligent marketing. The sparse evi-
dence available renders incomprehensible the conclusion that causation
was established by a preponderance of evidence. 1' Adoption of market
determine what percentage of criminals would obtain guns from non-negligent sources if they were not
readily available from negligent marketing. Were such statistics available they might have some Im-
pact on the proportional causation figures that would govern a plaintiff's recovery. How this issue Is
ultimately resolved should have no effect whatsoever under the fundamental but-for causation problem
discussed in the text. That issue raises the brute issue of what percentage of guns that exist on the
market can be attributed to negligent marketing.
99. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp2d 802, 826 (E.D.N.Y 1999). It should be noted that
while those who trace crime guns believe that a period of time measured from the initial sale of a gun
by an FFL to the gun being used in a crime less than three years later is an indication of "illegal traf-
ficking" of firearms, the report made by the ATF-which published the data relied upon by Judge
Weinstein in Hamilton, admits that the so-called three-year "time-to-crime" statistic is an "imperfect
indicator" of firearms trafficking. YouTH FIREARMS MARKERS IN 27 COMMUNITIES, supra note 97, at
8. The ATF has also established that the three-year time-to-crime figure is only an indicator of"possl-
ble illegal activity" by a dealer, but rather a period of less than one-year "time to crime" would be "a
very strong indicator" of illegal dealer behavior. Fox Butterfield, Gun Flow to Criminals Laid to Tiny
Fraction of Dealers, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACTS 14, July 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 30528902, at *2
(emphasis added). This suggests that the data relied upon in Hamilton is less reliable than portrayed,
that the ATF admits other variables can enter into the mix of how a criminal obtained a gun within
three years of a legal sale than just a dealer's negligent practices, and that a better one-year indicator Is
available to the trier of fact in negligent marketing cases such as Hamilton.
100. For a discussion of non-FFL sources by which criminals may obtain guns, see supra note 97.
101. Judge Weinstein's conclusion that causation was established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence is further undermined by the underlying weakness of the statistics upon which he relied. In the
Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative Report that published the data relied upon in Hamilton and
which the Hamilton expert, Joseph Vince, used in his testimony to attribute causation; the ATF admits
that the data is not yet comprehensive, consistently collected, or consistent enough between jurisdic-
tions studied so that sophisticated analysis, such as national aggregation, would be inappropriate. See
YOUTH FIREARMS MARKETS IN27 COMMUNITIE, supra note 97, at 8, 10, 16, A-I, A-2. Consequently,
the ATF explains that as yet, while the comprehensiveness of the tracing program increases and as law
enforcement and dealers become more complicit with procedural rigors, the ATF offers this data not
because it is statistically conclusive, but rather because it is "helpful" to law enforcement. See Id. at 7.
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share does nothing to resolve the problem of the indeterminate plaintiff.
Market share speaks only to the indeterminate defendant1m
The following additional factors outlined in the ATF report indicate that the tracing data relied
upon in Hamilton is not yet sophisticated enough to support any form of finding causation. A crime
gun as defined by the ATF is "any firearm that is illegally possessed, used in a crime, or =upecLd to
have been used in a crime." Id at 5 (emphasis added). This broad definition suggests that potentially a
far larger number of so-called crime guns that allegedly caused some form of injury are being attributed
to an FFL source for liability purposes than have actually been used in a crime that resulted in injury to
a person.
Additionally, the ATF has only been tracing firearms since approximately 1996. Only 27
municipal jurisdictions participate in tracing so far, up from only 10 jurisdictions prior to 1997; and
those 27 were volunteer cities, not representative areas chosen randomly or by cross section, for exam-
ple, in order to control for irrelevant variables. See Id at A-1. Of those 27 jurisdictions, at least 4,
including a notably high-crime city, Los Angeles, did not report crime guns for tracing as comprehen-
sively as did the other 24jurisdictions. See id at 7. The ATF also admits that not all of thosejurisdic-
ions with high volume of recovered crime guns are yet able to use the most accurate method of"elec-
tronic batch" tracing for high volumes. See Id at 16.
Additionally, not all crime guns appearing in the 27 jurisdictions are traced, only those crime
guns recovered by law enforcement See Id at 1. Moreover, of those crime guns even recovered, them
is a significant subset, as many as one-third, for mich no trace is ever attempted. See Id at 19. For
example, because of governmental economy and because the enabling legislation Wlch created the
record keeping requirements that allowed for tracing was enacted only in 1963, the ATF, for policy
reasons, has not traced recovered crime guns manufactured prior to 1968 at all, nor those manufactured
prior to 1990 unless law enforcement made a special individual request in order to solve an especially
difficult crime. See ad at 19 (noting that since the time period covered in this 1999 report, the ATF is
now able to trace guns manufactured as far back as 1985 by request). Consequently, the ATF may be
tracing a disproportionate amount of new and recently manuflctured guns more likely to have come
from an FFL source within the last three years and ignoring a potentially significant number of older
and used recurrent crime guns for which there are inadequate records.
There are other reasons why the pool of crime gun data may be less comprehensive or reliable
than as portrayed in Hamilton. The ATF admits that a significant portion of crime guns recovered, as
many as 11.4%4c, have obliterated serial numbers that make the gun untraceable ,ithout restoring the
number. However, as yet, not all jurisdictions reporting to the ATF are restoring obliterated numbers
for tracing, and those that do are not doing so uniformly for all of the guns they recovered with the
obliterated numbers. See id at 18. Additionally, the ATF concedes that used gms from both FFLs and
private sellers are untraceable due to inadequate record keeping and comprise a "significant source" of
crime guns. See id at 15. The ATF also explains that a variety of factors, such as data mismanage-
ment, differences in agency policy from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and faulty record keeping errors by
both law enforcement and dealers result in a significant reduction in successful traces of recovered
crime guns even where attempts are made. See Id at 19. The ATF also counsels that in order to get a
fuller picture of crime gun flow, its gun trace analysis should be augmented by other mzthodologies,
such as use of informants, exploiting cooperation of offenders, undercover work, and nterviews of
arrestees. See id at 15. Consequently, since the ATF itself recognizes that its data pool Is as yet insuf-
ficient to form statistically reliable conclusions, without more sophisticated and comprehensive data
collection and analysis, it would likely be inappropriate to base a finding of causation by the court in
Hamilton.
102. See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuailon and
Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE W. 376, 377 n.6 (1986) (referring to Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d
924 (Cal. 1980)) (recognizing that the "'indeterminate plaintiff' problem" is different from the "inde-
terminate defendant" of "Sindeil-type" cases which employ the "market share" approach).
In Hymowit: v. Eli Lilly Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y 1989), the court of appeals adopted market
share liability to allow compensation to the offspring of mothers who had taken DES during their
pregnancy as an anti-miscarriage drug. Due to the long latency period between the ingestion of the
drug by the mother and the onset of the cancers in DES daughters, it was impossible in most instances
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VI. HANDGUN CAUSATION: GETTING IT RIGHT
In the context of mass tort litigation, it is crucial that courts clearly set
forth a comprehensible theory of causation. The plaintiffs in Hamilton are
precursors of class members and even if cases proceed on some form of
consolidation in the future, the numbers of crime victims of hand guns will
run into the thousands. To pretend that each plaintiff is entitled to full re-
covery is to deny the reality that only a small percentage of those crimes
would have been avoided by non-negligent marketing of handguns. What
is so mystifying is that Judge Weinstein in Agent Orange recognized that
absent some form of proportional causation the mass torts could not be
fairly decided. 3 Yet, in Hamilton, he is willing to embrace the preponder-
ance standard with little evidence to back it.
The problem with this assumption is obvious. Recall that the plain-
tiff s causation argument is that the manufacturer's failure to exercise care
was more likely than not the cause of Steven Fox's injury.' 4 This means
that the failure of American Arms, for example, to do something made a
difference to whether or not Fox would have been shot that day in Brook-
lyn.1 5 But, if as Judge Weinstein notes, two-thirds of all guns used in ju-
venile crimes do not come directly from FFLs, but from other sources, that
means that even if American Arms had acted non-negligently, there still
was a sixty-six percent chance that the self-same injury would have oc-
curred."°
It would appear that Judge Weinstein assumes that the remaining
for the plaintiffs to prove which pharmaceutical company had manufactured the drug that caused any
given plaintiff's injury. Several hundred drug companies had manufactured and marketed DES. De-
fendants in Hamilton argued that market share theory was very limited under Hymowitz and could not
be extended to cover gun manufacturers. See Brief for Defendants-Appellants, Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
and American Arms, Inc., at 37.45 (Oct. 22, 1999), Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, No. 99-7753(L) (2d Cir.
1999); Brief of Defendants-Appellants Colt's Mfg. Co. and Taurus Intemat'l Mfg. Inc., at 19-26 (Oct.
22, 1999), Hamilton, (No. 99-7753(L)). Unlike Hymowitz where the product involved a generic risk
and a signature injury, in Hamilton the conduct of the gun manufacturers differed substantially between
one and another, and the risk of injury did not involve a signature risk such as DES. The defendant's
position appears to be bolstered by a recent decision of the Fourth Department in Brenner v. American
Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999), in which the court refused to apply market share to
the lead paint litigation based on arguments not far different than those propounded by the defendants
in Hamilton. A full discussion of market share liability is beyond the scope of this paper. We do note,
however, that the willingness of the court of appeals to adopt a proportional theory of causation for the
indeterminate defendant rather than imposing an all-or-nothing rule bodes well for the prospect that the
court would look favorably at a rule for proportional causation when faced with the problem of the
indeterminate plaintiff. See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Between 7wo Worlds: The Shiftfrom Individual to
Group Responsibility in the Law of Causation ofInjury, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1473 (1986).
103. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 836-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
104. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
105. Fox was shot by a sixteen year-old. See td at 808. This means that the statistics Weinstein
cited regarding juvenile crime guns apply; and consequently there existed a two-thirds chance that the
gun used to shoot Fox did not come from an FFL source. See id at 826; see also YOUTH FIREARMS
MARKETS IN 27 COMMUNITIES, supra note 97, at 6 (defining a "juvenile" as "age 17 and under" for
crime gun trace analysis purposes).
106. See Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
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thirty-three percent chance represented by the fact that one-third of all ju-
venile crime guns come from FFLs is tantamount to a finding that every
gun used in a crime traced to an FFL was in the market as a result of negli-
gence. However, it is not only logically possible that the gun which caused
Fox's death could have been obtained even had American Arms exercised
due care, it is a possibility that Judge Weinstein was obliged to consider.
Due care does not guarantee absolute safety. A residuum of risk that guns
properly marketed would find their way into criminals' hands must be con-
sidered.1"
It is clear to us that the negligence of gun manufacturers is the cause of
an additional risk which may have resulted in a harm to Fox. However, in
order to fairly determine the issue, it is the responsibility of the plaintiff to
identify the differential between the baseline risk produced by non-
negligent marketing and the ultimate risk produced by the defendants'
negligence.
Sophisticated analysis of statistical data can and should produce use-
able estimates that would enable a factflnder to assess proportional causa-
tion."'8 Unlike the question of whether a seaman could be saved by a
missing life raft in icy water,'" a question which is not amenable to statis-
tical analysis, in the handgun case, appropriately focused questions can and
should provide useful data.
We would have expected Judge Weinstein to have asked the following
questions:
(1) If American Arms had instructed its distributors to refuse to
sell any handguns to an FFL which was a "non-stocking gun
dealer," how many fewer guns would have been in the hands of
criminals in Brooklyn?"' This could be answered by determining
the ratio of total sales by FFLs to "non-stocking gun dealer" FFLs
by volume and the relative probability that a "non-stocking gun
107. Adding together the two-thirds of juvenile crime guns that come from non-FFL sources ac-
cording to ATF data cited in Hamilton, see Hamiton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 826, along with the admitted
alternative non-FFL means by which crime guns are obtained such as theft, see mTra note 97; and the
additional pool of non-FFL crime guns that may not have been successfully traced by law enforcement,
see supra note 101, this ignored residuum of risk could be quite large. We acknowledge that because
the number of traced juvenile non-FFL crime guns is larger (two-hirds) compared to one-half non-FFL
crime guns for the 18-24 age group, see Hamilton, 62 F. Supp.2d at 826, the residum of risk for the
18-24 age group would be somewhat smaller than that for juveniles. However, for either group, the
residuum remains too significant to ignore in the causation analysis.
108. See discussion of current crime gun data, supra note 101.
109. See New York Cent P.R. v. Grimstead, 364 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920) (noting that question of
whether victim would have been able to reach life preserver before drowning too speculative to submit
to jury).
110. According to plaintiffs, "non-stocking gun dealer[s]" sell "guns out of the tunk of their cas
their houses, and gun shows." Plainti---Appellees Brief; dated Dec. 10, 1999, at 9, Hamilton v. Accu-
Tek, No. 99-7753(L) (2d Cir. 1999). A non-stocking gun dealer, in other words, Is not a retail store.
They are sometimes referred to as "kitchen table dealers."
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dealer" FFL is more likely to sell a gun that will be used in a crime
than a retailer.
(2) If American Arms had instructed its distributors to refuse to
sell to any FFLs who sold either at gun shows or had customers
who made multiple purchases of more than ' handguns per
month, how many fewer guns would have been in the hands of
criminals in Brooklyn? Again, the answer to this question could be
determined through a similar analysis as set out in (1).
(3) If American Arms had instructed its distributors to refuse to
sell to any retail FFLs whose handguns were directly traceable to
criminal use at rates that were significantly higher than other stores
of similar sales volume and location, how many fewer guns would
have been in the hands of criminals in Brooklyn? Again, the an-
swer to this question could be determined through a similar analy-
sis as set out in (1) and (2).1
Without answers to these questions, damages will be assessed on the hy-
pothesis that every gun used in a crime that was directly traceable to an
FFL is the product of the failure to exercise reasonable control. As long as
courts indulge in that fancy this genre of claims should fail. They are
likely to fail in the mass tort setting but are also vulnerable in the idiosyn-
cratic case as we have illustrated above. Proportional causation provides
the only way in which plaintiffs, be they individuals, municipalities, or
members of a class, can credibly prosecute their claims. The fact that sta-
tistical estimates may be somewhat inexact should not be a deterrent as
long as the legal principles behind those numbers are consistent with our
law and our values.
11. It is not clear that the exercise of due care would require the manufacturers to refuse to deal
with all distributors who deal with retailers that are associated with a disproportionate number of
"crime" guns. The recent settlement between Smith & Wesson and the Government requires the manu-
facturer to terminate sales to distributors who have been the source of a disproportionate number of
crime guns if.the distributor fails to provide a "satisfactory" explanation for the statistical discrepancy.
See Smith & Wesson Settlement Agreement, Mar. 17, 2000, § E, available In NSSF Online Reports
(visited Mar. 24, 2000) <http'/www.nssforg>. This caveat in the settlement reflects that, as even the
ATF itself has noted, the fact that a dealer is linked with a high number of crime guns does not entail
that the dealer acted carelessly. See COMMECE IN FIREARMS, supra note 97, at 31 ("Some dealers
with a substantial number of crime gun traces and sales volume ranging from 6000 to 15,000 firearms
per year had no compliance problems.").
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VII. THE CAUSATION PROBLEM IN MERRILL V NA VEGAR AND
HALBERsTAM v. S.W. DANFL
Merrill v. Navegar Inc., raises the but-for causation issue in a some-
what different setting. In Navegar, plaintiffs were the survivors and repre-
sentatives of victims killed in a bloody massacre.'" On July 1, 1993, Gian
Luigi Ferri armed with two semi-automatic assault weapons manufactured
and distributed by Navegar as well as a .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol
entered a high-rise office building in San Francisco. Proceeding to the
thirty-fourth floor premises of a law firm against which he held a grudge,
Ferri opened fire on persons in the offices in the hallways. He then de-
scended to a lower floor to continue his shooting spree. When he was fin-
ished, he had killed eight men and women and wounded six others before
fatally shooting himself in the stairwell.'
14
Plaintiffs brought their claims based on three theories of liability:
common law negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability for ultrahaz-
ardous activities."1 The trial court granted Navegar's motion for summary
judgment and plaintiffs appealed. 6 An intermediate appellate court re-
versed finding that plaintiffs had made out a case for negligent marketing
of the assault weapons. 7 The crux of the negligent marketing claim was
that the specific model that Ferri purchased, the TEC-DC9, was marketed
to appeal specially to criminals.1 The litany of allegedly negligent mar-
keting claims is set forth by the court:
Navegar's advertising targeted "militarists" and "survivalists" by
advertising the TEC-DC9 in magazines they favored, such as Sol-
dier of Fortune, SWAT, Combat Handguns, Guns, Firepower, and
Heavy Metal Weapons. Navegar advertised the TEC-9 and TEC-
DC9 in a wide variety of publications it knew would be sold in
California. Navegar also displayed its weapons at "gun shows"
which are attended primarily by people who read these magazines.
According to Solodovnick, the substance of Navegar's advertising
and its other promotional activities were deliberately calculated to
attract "military-type thinking people" likely to use the weapon of-
fensively by referring to the TEC-DC9, for example, as an "as-
sault-type pistol." Navegar's advertisements emphasized the
"paramilitary" appearance of the weapon, including references to
"military non-glare" finish and "combat-type" sights. Among the
112. 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 146 (Cal. CL App. 1999), review granted, 991 P.2d 755 (Cal. 2000).
113. See Id at152.
114. Seeid
115. See id
116. See id
117. See Merrill, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 152.
118. See idat 156-58.
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advertising methods employed for the TEC-DC9 were using the
slogan, "tough as your toughest customer," in promotional materi-
als sent to dealers and distributors, but accessible to the general
public, and pointing out that the surface of the weapon had "ex-
cellent resistance to fingerprints." Solodovnick acknowledged that
people who were not knowledgeable about fingerprints could in-
terpret the latter representation as meaning fingerprints would not
be left on this weapon. Promotional materials also called attention
to other design features of the TEC-DC9 that would be of interest
to'persons interested in carrying out violent assaults or other illegal
activities, such as the "combat sling" and the threaded barrel,
which permitted the attachment of a silencer, flash suppressor or
barrel extension." 9
The plaintiffs introduced a report from a forensic and clinical psy-
chologist who specialized in "'affective violence and predatory violence
during mass murder' who opined that based on the personality profile of
Ferri and the meticulous planning that went into the mass murder that the
marketing of the TEC-DC9 "'likely emboldened Ferri to undertake mass
killings without fear of failure"' and was a "'substantial factor in his deci-
sion to carry out his mass murder...."2
2 0
In reviewing the summary judgment finding of the lower court the ap-
pellate court found that the expert's opinion was sufficient to create a tri-
able issue of fact on causation.21 There are several difficulties with the
court's finding. First, even treating this case as an isolated idiosyncratic
event allowing a finding of causation on such a slender thread is troubling.
Attempting to work out the complexities of what contributed to the conduct
of one who was planing a revenge mass murder is no simple matter. This
is not asking whether a locked door would have prevented the entry of a
criminal on the premises."n Rather it is an after the fact retrospective that
is speculative at best. It may be of interest to a radio or television audience
on a talk show where speculation and theorizing is the order of the day. It
hardly suffices as proof of causation. Wrapping the expert opinion in the
"substantial factor" terminology does not solve the problem. If it is
speculative whether the advertising had any impact on Ferri's conduct,
then it is not a factor at all, let alone a substantial factor.
However, whether the criminal was a mass murderer or one involved
in a single murder the reality is that this claim of negligent marketing of
handguns being a factor in the commission of a crime will repeat itself time
and again. These cases are mass torts in disguise. Once the template for
119. Id at 157-58.
120. Ido at 158, 188.
121. See id at 188-89.
122. See supra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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this type of litigation is set it will be alleged in every complaint and experts
will opine that the negligent marketing had some influence on the criminal
act in which the handgun was utilized. Guns do embolden criminals. And
guns that are advertised will be said to embolden them even more. We will
thus see an entire genre of litigation in which the causation issue will go to
juries for full value damages without any evaluation as to how much the
so-called negligence in marketing increased the risk. Real world realities
cannot be ignored by courts without bringing the judicial process into dis-
repute.-
The lesson from Hamilton and Navegar is clear. The traditional pre-
ponderance rule for causation cannot be utilized to impose liability. The
true likelihood that the self-same injuries would have taken place without
the negligent marketing are so high that no rational court should impose
liability on such a low probability that the marketing caused the criminal
act"1 The only way that courts can find causation is to utilize a propor-
tionality approach to causation. To do so will require that courts demand
the production of some data to support proportionalization. One need not
expect the data to be exact. Good reasonable estimates by experts will
have to suffice." If such data cannot be developed then the negligent
marketing cases must fail.1"
One final word about the third negligent marketing case to go to trial,
Halberstam v. S.W. Daniel, Inc.1'6 The shooting in that case took place on
March 1, 1994, the Jewish holiday of Purim." Four days earlier Baruch
Goldstein massacred twenty-nine Palestinian worshipers at a Mosque in
Hebron, Israel." In apparent retaliation for the Hebron Massacre, a Pales-
tinian, Rashid Baz shot two Hasidic Jews who were driving in a van across
the Brooklyn Bridge. One of the pistols was a Cobray M-1119 which fired
eighteen shots in just a few seconds. "The Cobray M-11/9 was assembled
from parts manufactured and marketed through mail order assembly kits by
a company owned by Wayne and Sylvia Daniel.!"" The Halberstam case
contained negligent marketing claims based on advertising that targeted
criminals seeking to avoid federal restrictions on firearms possession and
123. See supra notes 97, 99, 101, 107.
124. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: PRoDucTs LIABULITY § 16 cnmt. c (1997) (discussing level of
proof required to establish increased risk of harm in context of automobile crashworthiness product
defect cases and determining that while proof of increased risk in these instances Is "often difficult,
[nonetheless when] an expert offers a rational explanation derived from causal analysi, the testimony
should [be admitted for] consideration by the trier of fact").
125. We are aware of the inadequacies of the data currently but are hopeful that better data rets can
be developed. See smira note 101.
126. No. 95 Civ. 3323 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (pleading and court orders on file in clerk's office at the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York): see also Lytton, smra note 25 (discussing
the case).
127. See Lytton, supra note 25, at 686.
128. See id (citing The Jerusalem Reportvol. IX, no. 1, at 160 (1988)).
129. Id at686.
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transfer.3 This was done by marketing firearm parts in assembly kits.
Since the sale was not of an assembled weapon it was not subject to normal
firearms sales and licensing regulations.' Plaintiffs further cited ads for
the Cobray M -11/9 that touted it as "[t]he Gun that made the 80's Roar."'132
The ads further proclaimed that the gun was "the controversial 'Drug Lord'
choice of Cobray firearms throughout the '80s... [and featured] a cartoon
of an Al Capone-style gangster in a pin striped suit and a fedora wielding a
submachine gun. 133
The defendants argued that it owed no duty to protect against the use of
its guns by criminals and that its advertising was not negligent.'34 As to
causation the defendants argued that Rashid Baz said that he had never
seen any advertisement for the Cobray M-1 1/9, nor had he purchased the
gun from the defendant but instead bought it off the street. 3 Furthermore,
the defendant argued that the plaintiff was not able to produce evidence as
to how many parts of the gun used by Baz were marketed by the
defendant.'36 The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. In response to
questions posed on the special verdict form the jury found that the Cobray
M-11/9 caused the plaintiff's injuries and that "the defendants marketed the
parts kit which 'substantially constituted' the weapon."' 37 "In response to
the question 'Did the defendants' negligence cause Aaron Halberstam's
death?' the jury answered 'no.""9138
Given the negative jury finding on causation, the pure issue of law as
to whether negligent marketing cases should go to juries without causa-
tional data was not decided. Once again we note that full recovery in this
genre of litigation would be unwarranted. Without some discount for the
huge background risk attendant to the widespread presence of non negli-
gently marketed handguns in our society we can not assess the damages for
the claims arising from negligent marketing.
Some may believe that drastic discounting of damages to account for
background risk will not make these cases worthwhile to litigate. The an-
swer to this dilemma is not to pervert the litigation process by assessing
damages that are not fairly attributable to the defendant's conduct. If, how-
130. See id at 687-88.
131. See a (citing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Halberstam (No. 95 Civ. 3323)).
132. Lytton, supra note 25, at 688 (citing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint at Ex. C, Ex. I.,
Halherstam (No. 95 Civ. 3323)).
133. Id at 686.
134. See id. at 691-92.
135. See id at 693 (citing Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, 18, Halberstam (No. 95
Civ. 3323)).
136. See Id at 693 (citing Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss at 3 & nn.4-5, 18, Halberstam
(No. 95 Civ. 3323)).
137. Lytton, supra note 25, at 697 (citing Transcript of Trial at 1697, 1731, 1740 (Mar. 26, 1998),
Halberstam (No. 95 Civ. 3323)).
138. Id at 697 (citing Transcript of Trial at 1740-43 (Mar. 27, 1998), Halberstam (No. 95 Civ. 3323)
(emphasis added)).
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ever, the conduct of the defendant is deemed sufficiently outrageous to
support a finding of punitive damages then the specter of such damages
may serve as an inducement to bring the actions. Whether the negligent
marketing set forth in these cases is sufficiently egregious to support puni-
tive damages is beyond the scope of this paper.
Ultimately the judiciary -will not be able to hide from the problem that
the causation issue in these cases is far too speculative to allow for full
damages recovery. If courts are to allow these actions to proceed data will
have to be developed to support proportional recovery. In the absence of
data these cases are simply notjusticiable on the issue of causation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
One can easily sympathize with the desire of courts to compensate the
victims of such terrible crimes as those suffered by the plaintiffs in Hamil-
ton, Navegar, and Halberstam. This is especially true when there is some
evidence that a handful of actors, such as firearm manufacturers and dis-
tributors, appear to enable in some manner a large number of such crimes.
It is clear from Hamilton and Navegar--as well as the ATF's own data
establishing numerous non-negligent alternative avenues of criminals ob-
taining guns-that causation cannot be established under the preponder-
ance standard. Consequently, plaintiffs' only rational recourse is propor-
tional recovery. Proper application of the proportional causation mecha-
nism, however, requires the use of sophisticated data, preferably subject to
regression analysis that controls for background noise and other variables
beside negligent marketing that contribute to criminals obtaining guns that
cause a victim's injuries. A plaintiff's use of such data, at the very least,
must establish a baseline of risk of firearm injuries produced by non-
negligent marketing practices contrasted with the ultimate risk produced by
defendants' alleged negligent marketing practices.
The courts that have evaluated negligent marketing of firearms claims
thus far in Hamilton and Navegar have ignored these data requirements
and thus have allowed for the possibility of such claims being submitted to
juries for full damages without any true valuation of the increased risk cre-
ated by the defendants' negligent practices. While such outcomes may
seem satisfying in the short run on the facts of the injuries in these cases,
they are determined at the expense of creating a degraded standard of cau-
sation to be applied in all circumstances in the future, a standard which
hides from juries the fact that the link between defendants' behavior and
the victims' injuries is far too speculative to allow for full recovery. Such
culpability in the air is not and cannot be the standard of recovery under
tort law.

